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I. INTRODUCTION: THE TWO SIDES OF FEDERALISM 
The revival of federalism has become a defining theme of the 
modern Court.  Commentators have described the Court’s decisions 
as sparking a “federalism revolution.”  This so-called revolution 
comes after a long dormancy.  From the late 1930s to the early 1990s, 
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constitutional provisions related to federalism were largely ignored.  
However, under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
the Court has attempted to revive the constitutional role and author-
ity of the states. 
Through a wide array of cases employing both the Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendments, the Court has stalled or even reversed the 
constitutional drift of power from the states to the federal govern-
ment that began in the 1930s.  This “new federalism” has attempted 
to resuscitate the role of the states in the constitutional system, as well 
as revive certain federalism doctrines that were abandoned during 
the New Deal.  Just as a frustration with the ineffectual response of 
the states to the Great Depression caused regulators and constitu-
tional lawyers to favor a dramatic expansion of the national govern-
ment during the 1930s, a frustration with and suspicion of large, cen-
tralized government and its inflexible bureaucracies has helped fuel 
the current drift toward empowering smaller, localized governments.  
But in addition to this size-of-government concern, there is another 
side of federalism—the individual liberty side.  In the view of the con-
stitutional Framers, a vibrant federalism would help ensure individual 
liberty by limiting and monitoring the power of the federal govern-
ment to infringe on the liberties of its citizens. 
One of the primary constitutional rationales behind federalism 
was the belief that such a governmental structure would help preserve 
individual liberty.  Strong and independent state governments would 
check any abuses committed by the federal government.  This struc-
tural aspect of the Constitution served as a complement to the Bill of 
Rights, which explicitly recognized certain selected individual free-
doms.  But whereas the Bill of Rights protections were limited to its 
identified freedoms, federalism had a much broader scope: built into 
the very structure of America’s constitutional democracy, federalism 
would protect individual liberty as a whole, in every aspect in which it 
could be threatened by a distant central government. 
This liberty aspect of federalism was largely abandoned in the 
1930s when the Court ceased enforcing the federalism provisions of 
the Constitution.  This cessation marked a necessary step in uphold-
ing the New Deal legislation, which gave broad powers to the national 
government.  Having given up this structural protection of liberty, 
the Court then focused almost exclusively on the substantive individ-
ual rights provisions in the Constitution as a way of protecting indi-
vidual freedom.  It was this focus, for instance, that led the Court to 
derive new, unenumerated rights out of the general language of the 
Constitution, such as the right to privacy.  Instead of relying upon the 
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structural organization of the Constitution to protect privacy, the 
Court created a specific substantive right. 
Looking back over nearly seventy years of constitutional history, 
an inverse relationship can be detected between the Court’s activism 
on substantive individual rights and its enforcement of structural 
provisions such as federalism.  The less the Court enforces structural 
provisions, the more it relies on creating and enforcing substantive 
individual rights.  Consequently, now that the Court is reinvigorating 
federalism, it should correspondingly lessen its activism on individual 
rights, such as the right to privacy.  In effect, this would form the sec-
ond half of the federalism revolution—a stepping back from substan-
tive individual rights as the only protection of individual liberty.  
However, this has not yet occurred.  Even though federalism has been 
reinvigorated, the Court still relies as much as ever on judicial en-
forcement of substantive individual rights for the preservation of lib-
erty. 
History has shown that the Court elevated its scrutiny of individ-
ual rights, as well as its creation of new rights, only after it down-
graded its scrutiny of structural issues like federalism.  Therefore, it is 
logical to expect that the reverse should happen: that after heighten-
ing its review of federalism doctrines it should diminish its scrutiny of 
substantive individual rights.  By taking such an approach, the Court 
could reconnect with the structural ways in which the Constitution 
protects liberty as a whole.  Moreover, putting added emphasis on the 
Constitution’s structural protections of liberty would help revive a no-
tion that has practically disappeared in constitutional law: the notion 
that individual liberty can and must coincide with majoritarian rule. 
This Article begins Part II with a description of federalism and a 
discussion of its basic principles as they appear in the Constitution.  It 
examines the Framers’ intent concerning the federalism scheme in-
corporated into the Constitution, as well as the purposes for which 
those federalism principles were intended.  Part III of the Article ad-
dresses the history of federalism decisions in the Supreme Court.  In 
particular, it analyzes the decline of federalism throughout much of 
the twentieth century, during which time the Court intensified its re-
view of individual rights cases so as to make up for its nonenforce-
ment of structural provisions (e.g., federalism) designed to protect 
individual liberty.  Part III also examines the Rehnquist Court’s re-
cent revival of federalism, which has occurred primarily in three con-
stitutional areas: the Tenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and 
the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity provisions. 
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In Part IV, this Article examines the constitutional role of feder-
alism as a structural protection of liberty.  This structural feature was 
intended by the Framers to provide a more all-encompassing protec-
tion of individual liberty than the Bill of Rights.  However, because of 
the constitutional compromise of the 1930s, the Court abandoned 
the structural protections of federalism and instead focused its sights 
exclusively on selected substantive individual rights.  Part V addresses 
the consequences of this constitutional compromise, the corrosive 
fallout of which can be seen through the creation and application of 
the constitutional right of privacy.  Finally, in the Conclusion, this Ar-
ticle suggests that the modern Court has accomplished only one half 
of a federalism revolution.  Although it has strengthened the consti-
tutional role and authority of the states, it has not carried the revolu-
tion over into the individual liberty area.  Instead of increasing its re-
liance on the structural provisions of the Constitution to protect 
liberty, the Court is still concentrating almost exclusively on substan-
tive individual rights. 
II. THE FEDERALISM DOCTRINE 
A. Constitutional Principles 
The doctrine of federalism refers to the sharing of power be-
tween two different levels of government, each representing the same 
people.1  The Constitution establishes a dual governmental structure 
consisting of state and national governments.  Although its purpose 
was to create a strong national government, the Constitution also 
sought to preserve the independent integrity and lawmaking author-
ity of the states.2  This bifurcated system of power was codified in the 
Tenth Amendment, which divides sovereign power between those 
delegated to the federal government and those reserved to the states.3  
 
 1 Federalism reflects the balancing of power between the states and national 
government.  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (suggesting that the con-
stitutional scheme envisions a federal structure in which states are equal partners 
with the national government).  As David Walker describes it: 
federalism is a governmental system that includes a central government 
and at least one major subnational tier of governments; that assigns 
significant substantive powers to both levels initially by the provisions of 
a written constitution; and that succeeds over time in sustaining a terri-
torial division of powers by judicial, operational, representational and 
political means. 
DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 20 
(1995). 
 2 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987). 
 3 Id. at 1492. 
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The Tenth Amendment prohibits the national government from ex-
ercising undelegated powers that will infringe on the lawmaking 
autonomy of the states.4 
The Framers believed that by protecting the pre-existing struc-
ture of state governments, the Constitution could safely grant power 
to the national government, since the former would independently 
monitor the latter’s exercise of power.5  Similar to the way in which 
the colonial governments had mobilized opposition to oppressive acts 
by Parliament, the state governments would serve as vigilant watch-
dogs against abuses committed by the federal government.6 
The founding generation was so committed to federalism that 
even a nationalist like Justice Marshall acknowledged in McCulloch v. 
Maryland7 that the national government was “one of enumerated 
powers” and could “exercise only the powers granted to it.”8  Indeed, 
federalism concerns were so important to the Founders that nearly all 
the arguments opposing the new Constitution involved the threat to 
state sovereignty.9 
Although there is no single “federalism” clause in the Constitu-
tion, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments are often the focus of the 
Court’s federalism decisions.10  In addition to these two amendments, 
references to federalism pervade the constitutional scheme.  
Throughout the text, the Framers use the term “states” to denote in-
dependent entities of sovereignty.11  The term “states” is also used in a 
way that suggests the Framers “intended that these governments pos-
sess some of the traditional immunities that states enjoyed” prior to 
adoption of the Constitution.12 
 
 4 The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 5 See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 108–11 (1981). 
 6 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961); Amar, supra note 2, at 1501. 
 7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 8 Id. at 405. 
 9 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 252 (2000). 
 10 The Eleventh Amendment states that the “Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 11 Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual 
Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
819, 821, 831–34 (1999). 
 12 Id. at 821.  According to Nicholas Rosenkranz, the structure of the Constitu-
tion and its recognition of the “states” all work to establish federalism as a “constitu-
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In the constitutional scheme, federalism provides an avenue for 
local self-determination, in addition to a vertical check on govern-
ment oppression, with the states serving as a localized control on the 
centralized national government.13  Under the Framers’ view of fed-
eralism, the national government would exert supreme authority only 
within the limited scope of its enumerated powers; the states mean-
while would exercise the remainder of sovereign authority, subject to 
the restraint of interstate competition from other states.14 
Because the Framers took for granted the sovereign powers of 
the states, the Constitution is somewhat one-sided in its references to 
governmental authority.  It explicitly lists the powers of the federal 
government; but to the extent it defines state powers, it does so pri-
marily through negative implication, by setting out the limited con-
straints on those powers.15  Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment, 
though not granting power to any governmental entity, recognizes 
that any and all powers not granted to the federal government have 
been reserved to the states.16 
By prohibiting the federal government from infringing on pow-
ers reserved to the states, the Constitution establishes a system of dual 
sovereignty.  The Framers “split the atom of sovereignty” by designat-
ing two different political entities (federal and state), “each protected 
from incursion by the other.”17  This division of authority between the 
state and federal governments, with the latter enjoying only limited, 
enumerated powers, was not created for the benefit of the states but 
for the benefit of the American people.18  According to the Framers, 
the principle of dual sovereignty would prevent any distortion of the 
balance of power that in turn would subject the people to a tyrannous 
federal government.19  As Professor Steven Calabresi explains, federal-
ism is a vital ingredient of America’s constitutional democracy: 
 
tional default rule.”  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2097 (2002). 
 13 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 504 
(1987). 
 14 William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison’s Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2002). 
 15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: 
On Reading the Constitution in Plato’s Cave, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 555 (2000). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. X; Bybee, supra note 15, at 567. 
 17 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  The Constitution created a structure of “two orders of government, 
each with its own direct relationship . . . to the people who sustain it and are gov-
erned by it.”  Id. 
 18 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
 19 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–60 (1991). 
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It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and 
it prevents racial warfare.  It is part of the reason why democratic 
majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence 
or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in 
England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Cyprus, or Spain.  There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is 
more important or that has done more to promote peace, pros-
perity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great 
document.20 
Principles of federalism are also incorporated within the Su-
premacy Clause.21  The Supremacy Clause safeguards federalism by 
requiring that any federal law displacing a state law be adopted ac-
cording to the precise lawmaking procedures outlined in the Consti-
tution.22  Even in those delegated areas where the national govern-
ment has authority over the states, the Supremacy Clause limits the 
federal laws to those meeting the constitutional procedures for “the 
supreme Law of the Land.”  Thus, federal lawmaking procedures pre-
serve state autonomy by “‘impos[ing] burdens on governmental 
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.’”23  
Although these cumbersome processes are often decried as contrib-
uting to gridlock, they give states more freedom to govern by making 
it more difficult for the federal government to enact national laws 
that supersede state laws.24 
The notion of federalism, premised on fostering a competition 
for power between state and federal governments, is similar in many 
ways to the constitutional separation of powers between the branches 
of government.25  Both are structural provisions of the Constitution, 
 
 20 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 770 (1995). 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause states: “This Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”  Id. 
 22 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1338–39 (2001).  “Although federal lawmaking procedures are generally 
regarded as ‘integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers,’ 
they also preserve federalism both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and 
by assigning lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of 
federalism.”  Id. at 1324 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983)).  The 
Constitution also protects federalism by ensuring small-state equality of representa-
tion in the U.S. Senate and by giving states a prominent role in the selection of the 
President.  Id. at 1343–44, 1367–68. 
 23 Id. at 1371 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959) (alteration in original). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 950 (2005) (arguing that, to the Framers, the competition among branches 
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with the separation of powers doctrine focusing on the horizontal al-
location of power among the different branches of the federal gov-
ernment.26  Federalism, on the other hand, addresses the vertical al-
location of power and rests upon the Framers’ belief that “each of the 
principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence 
more or less to the favor of the State Governments.”27 
B. The Values of Federalism 
The most-often cited value of federalism is that it provides a 
check on the tyranny of the federal government.28  By granting only 
limited powers to the national government, as well as by maintaining 
two levels of competing governments, the Framers sought to control 
the power of the national government.29  A second value of federalism 
relates to the close relationship between state governments and their 
constituencies, the assumption being that the smaller the governing 
unit, the more likely it is to be responsive to the needs of the com-
munity.30  Smaller political units are also able to foster a deeper sense 
 
would result in “a balanced equilibrium, in which no branch can accumulate a po-
tentially monarchical or tyrannical quantum of power, try as each of them will”). 
 26 It was foreseen that the separation of powers alone would offer little protection 
to the states, since it was presumed that all the federal branches would share an in-
terest in expanding national power.  John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1390–91 (1997). 
 27 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 28 Federalism offers a structure of “overlapping legal remedies for constitutional 
wrongs.”  Amar, supra note 2, at 1504.  Although recent history focuses most atten-
tion on instances where the federal government has stepped in to remedy state viola-
tions of civil rights, there have also been times when the states have been called upon 
to address federal abuses.  Id. at 1506.  Prior to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for example, only the state 
law of trespass was available to persons whose homes had been illegally searched by 
federal agents.  Amar, supra note 2, at 1506.  Furthermore, in the early state habeas 
corpus cases, states provided a means by which those who were incarcerated in fed-
eral prisons, “in violation of their federal constitutional rights,” could obtain their 
freedom.  Id. at 1509. 
 29 Alexander Hamilton argued that the “necessity of local administrations for lo-
cal purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a 
power.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  A “state/federal division of authority protects liberty—both by restricting the 
burdens that government can impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen par-
ticipation in government that is closer to home.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 655 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 30 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995); Michael McCon-
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–94 
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BURGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).  State 
legislatures are better connected to their constituents’ interests than is Congress.  See 
V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 875 (2004).  
National decisionmakers or representatives are less likely to be aware of localized in-
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of community and increased opportunities for political participa-
tion.31  As Professor Wechsler has observed, the states “are the strate-
gic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the spe-
cial centers of political activity, [and] the separate geographical 
determinants of national as well as local politics.”32 
A third value of federalism lies in its facilitation of states as labo-
ratories of experimentation.33  This value is reflected in Justice 
Brandeis’s observation that “one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system [is] that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”34  Of course, underlying this 
social laboratory value, as well as all the other values of federalism, is 
the right of individuals to move from state to state, and hence “vote 
with their feet” on the desirability or wisdom of particular state poli-
cies.35 
 
terests than are decisionmakers or representatives in a disaggregated, state system.  
Id. 
 31 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that federalism 
“makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mo-
bile citizenry”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789–90 
(1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that federal-
ism fosters citizen participation in government affairs). 
 32 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954). 
 33 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism “allows for more innovation 
and experimentation in government”).  As Justice O’Connor has observed, “the 50 
States [have] serve[d] as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, 
and political ideas.”  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 788 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Furthermore, unlike Congress and the na-
tional government, the states are “neck-deep in the quotidian work of policing 
streets, educating children, feeding the hungry, sheltering the homeless, and pro-
tecting the public health.”  Aaron Jay Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the States, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439, 1443 (2005). 
 34 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).  And not just state legislatures are capable of this experimentation.  State judges 
“‘demonstrate a greater willingness to experiment with legal norms,’” and because 
they “‘are generally closer to the public’” any misjudgments they make are “‘more 
readily redressable by the People.’”  Saiger, supra note 33, at 1458–59 (quoting Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1163, 1168 (1999)). 
 35 Anuj C. Desai, Filters and Federalism: Public Library Internet Access, Local Control, 
and the Federal Spending Power, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 52 (2004); see also William Van 
Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane 
Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 777 (arguing that the “constraints imposed as an incident of 
federalism itself, namely that people can and will move, enter, or exit, if suitably at-
tracted or repelled, as each state has reason to bear in mind”).  Scholars argue that state 
autonomy “allows those who disagree with certain policies, but are politically power-
less to change them, to leave the jurisdiction or choose not to locate there in the first 
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The existence of a multiplicity of geographically diverse jurisdic-
tions is believed to “promote competition among governments for 
citizens and corporations (and their related tax dollars), thereby 
maximizing choice and utility for everyone and resulting in an aggre-
gate increase in social welfare.”36  This geographic diversity argument 
pervades the various justifications for federalism.  A federalism struc-
ture “assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive 
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”37  It allows different 
communities to choose different laws and modes of governance that 
reflect the diversity of citizen needs and interests.38  To the extent that 
local majorities in different states have divergent preferences, a fed-
eral system can result in a higher degree of citizen satisfaction than a 
unitary system can.39  If, for example, a majority in one state prefers a 
policy of high taxes and high levels of government services, whereas 
the majority in another state favors low taxes and fewer government 
services, both majorities can be accommodated by their respective 
state governments.40  A competition between states can also prevent 
 
place.”  Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 512 (2002). 
 36 Desai, supra note 35, at 50. 
 37 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 38 Desai, supra note 35, at 49. 
 39 John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 106 (2004). 
 40 The ability of federalism to satisfy diverse preferences obviously requires a de-
gree of citizen mobility, whereby citizens who find themselves in a state whose poli-
cies they oppose “can move to another state with more favorable ones.”  Id. at 107.  
“As transportation costs have fallen, and a national culture makes Americans feel 
more at home outside the state where they were born, citizens have become more 
mobile.”  Id. at 109.  This mobility is further enhanced by the existence of interstate 
competition through which states actively compete with each other to attract new 
citizens.  Id. at 108.  “Interstate competition is motivated, in part, by the desire of 
state governments to attract taxpaying citizens and corporations, which has the effect 
of increasing the funds available to them for public spending of all kinds.”  Id. 
Even the Justices who dissented from the Court’s recent federalism decisions es-
pouse the need for “robust [political] competition.”  Richard H. Pildes, The Constitu-
tionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 123 (2004).  Justice Stevens de-
scribes competition as “the ‘central theme’ of the Court’s democracy jurisprudence.” 
Id. (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 382 (1997) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)). 
According to Professor Amar: 
a healthy competition among limited governments for the hearts of the 
American People can protect popular sovereignty and spur a race to 
the high ground of constitutional remedies.  Each government can act 
as a remedial cavalry of sorts, eager to win public honor by riding to 
the rescue of citizens victimized by another government’s misconduct. 
Amar, supra note 2, at 1428. 
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the abuses often associated with monopoly status: “If individuals and 
firms are freely mobile and can choose among a number of jurisdic-
tions, they will shop for the jurisdiction that offers their most-
preferred policy package of public goods, regulations and tax rates.”41 
III. FEDERALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Decline of Federalism 
Essentially, only two major federalism decisions came down from 
the Court between 1937 and 1986: Oregon v. Mitchell,42 which was over-
turned by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and National League of Cities 
v. Usery,43 later overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.44  Thus, for a half century, and throughout the terms of the 
Warren and Burger Courts, federalism was largely a forgotten issue.  
Prior to 1937, however, the Court was far more willing to scrutinize 
the overreaching of federal power and its infringement on state 
autonomy.45 
 
There are critics of this interstate competition.  These critics see competition as 
being a destructive force.  For instance, it used to be thought that competition for 
industry would cause states to lower environmental standards, “leading to a destruc-
tive ‘race to the bottom,’ preventable only by the federalization of environmental 
regulation.”  Levinson, supra note 25, at 946.  Indeed, this would be the course ex-
pected if states were seen as concerned exclusively with industrial growth.  Id. at 946–
47.  However, because state residents value the environment, along with industry, 
state governments have been found not to maximize industrial growth at the expense 
of all other concerns, but to balance the benefits of industrial growth with the costs 
of pollution.  Id. at 947. 
 41 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 945. 
 42 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 43 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 44 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist 
Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (2004). 
 45 See Desai, supra note 35, at 115 (noting the Court’s willingness in the context of 
Congress’s taxing power).  A dual sovereignty model of federalism prevailed from 
1789 until the New Deal.  WALKER, supra note 1, at 24.  This dual sovereignty envi-
sions an equal distribution of power between the state and federal levels of govern-
ment and, according to some scholars, constitutes “the essential federalist feature of 
the Constitution.”  Id. at 23. 
From Reconstruction to the New Deal, courts “continued to cite the Ninth 
Amendment in conjunction with the Tenth as one of the twin guardians of state 
autonomy.”  Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 597, 601 (2005).  Both Amendments “serve as barriers against the expansion of 
federal power.”  Id. at 602.  Although initially used to resist President Roosevelt’s ef-
forts to regulate the national economy, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
ended up being “reduced to no more than truisms” by the New Deal constitutional 
revolution.  Id. 
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During the nineteenth century and throughout the early twenti-
eth, the Court adhered to a federalist vision, under which it “made 
substantial use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional 
power.”46  But after 1937, the Court switched positions, adopting a na-
tionalist model.47  In the wake of the New Deal, the expansion of fed-
eral powers increasingly eroded the Tenth Amendment protections, 
and the Court from 1937 to roughly the 1990s “served generally as a 
major force for centripetalism.”48  During that time, not one federal 
law was held to exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause powers, and 
only one federal law was ruled to violate the Tenth Amendment.49 
The year 1937 is seen as a transformational year in the Court’s 
approach to the exertion of national power; in that year, President 
Roosevelt sent to Congress a bill that would authorize him to appoint 
one new Supreme Court justice for each sitting justice who had 
served ten years or more and had not retired within six months after 
his seventieth birthday.50  Under this “court-packing” plan, the num-
ber of Supreme Court justices was to be raised to fifteen.51  Whether 
the Court was influenced by this bill and its likely passage cannot be 
known for sure; but shortly thereafter, the Court began upholding 
New Deal legislation of the kind that had previously been struck 
down.  Initiating a new era of constitutional interpretation, the Su-
preme Court endorsed a permanent enlargement in the scope of 
federal power, at the expense of the states.52  Under this relaxed pos-
ture toward congressional power, the Court would uphold a wide 
range of statutes over the next fifty years, including congressional 
 
 46 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 8 (2000).  For 
instance, the Court ruled that a congressional act banning the shipment of goods 
made by child labor violated the Tenth Amendment.  Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1941). 
 47 Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 8. 
 48 WALKER, supra note 1, at 27.  Whenever the Court was presented with chal-
lenges to the expansion of national authority during this period, it “almost always 
upheld these actions.”  Id.  Thus, the Court has been very much on the side of na-
tional authority.  The chief exception to this rule is the Court’s decision in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which in turn proved to be aberrational.  
Id. 
 49 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852, overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531, 557 (1985).  The Commerce Clause states that 
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 3. 
 50 WALKER, supra note 1, at 95. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
305 U.S. 197 (1938). 
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regulation of racial discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion and purely local incidents of loan sharking.53 
During the constitutional period, the states served both as the 
primary check on the central government and as the primary venue 
for self-government; but during the New Deal, states appeared help-
less to address the social crisis brought on by the Great Depression.54  
Furthermore, the notion that the states would act as a check on the 
federal government seemed irrelevant, considering the urgent need 
for immediate national action.  Thus, unconcerned with protecting 
states from congressional overreaching, the Court in the late 1930s 
permitted the explosion of federal regulation.55 
As an example of a pre-1937 case, United States v. Butler56 involved 
a constitutional challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  Ruling 
that the power to regulate agriculture was not among Congress’s 
enumerated powers, the Court struck down the Act.57  Moreover, 
“[b]ecause regulating agriculture was a power reserved exclusively to 
the states, the principle of ‘dual sovereignty,’ as embodied in the 
Tenth Amendment, precluded Congress” from interfering in this 
area.58 
According to some commentators, “Butler represents the high-
water mark of the Court’s adherence to the principles of ‘dual sover-
eignty.’. . . By the end of the 1936 Term, the Court had eliminated 
most of the federalism constraints on Congress’s powers . . . .”59  Soon 
thereafter, it was giving almost complete deference to Congress in 
 
 53 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261–62 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 299–301 (1964). 
 54 Sunstein, supra note 13, at 442. 
 55 For criticisms of this constitutional approach and its betrayal of the Framers’ 
intent, see generally Calabresi, supra note 20, at 752; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, 
and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979); William Marshall, 
American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
139 (1998); Yoo, supra note 26, at 1311. 
 56 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 57 Id. at 68. 
 58 Desai, supra note 35, at 80. 
 59 Id. at 89–90.  Furthermore, “[t]he last time the court held that a federal tax was 
a ‘regulatory’ tax exceeding Congress’s taxing power was in 1936.”  Id. at 84 (refer-
ring to Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)).  Carter v. Carter Coal Co. held 
“that a tax . . . on coal produced by coal producers who would not ‘agree’ to  
extensive regulations setting forth, among other things, wages [and] working condi-
tions . . . could not rest upon the taxing power.”  Id. at 84 n.352.  The following year, 
in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), the Court upheld a license tax on 
firearms dealers.  Id. at 84.  Commentators have viewed Sonzinsky as a repudiation of 
the pre-1937 approach.  Id. 
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any conflict with the Tenth Amendment.60  In Darby, the Court 
treated the Tenth Amendment not as a substantive restraint on fed-
eral power, but as simply “declaratory of the relationship between the 
national and state governments.”61  To the Court, the Tenth Amend-
ment had no real constitutional role; it was merely a “truism.”62  The 
implication of this pronouncement, however, is that the enumerated 
powers doctrine carries no judicially enforceable power.63 
The Burger Court in 1976 briefly revived the Tenth Amend-
ment.  In National League of Cities v. Usery,64 the Court struck down 
federal wage and overtime requirements applying to state employees, 
reasoning that the power to determine wages was an “undoubted at-
tribute of state sovereignty” and a core governmental function “essen-
tial to [the] separate and independent existence” of state sover-
eignty.65  Justice Rehnquist explained that “there are attributes of 
sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be 
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative 
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the 
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that man-
ner.”66  Though conceding the broad Commerce Clause powers pos-
sessed by Congress, the Court nonetheless crafted a Tenth Amend-
ment exception when the object of those powers was a state 
government.67  The “traditional governmental functions” test was 
used to determine whether congressional regulation had violated the 
Tenth Amendment.68  The difficulty with this test, however, was in de-
fining the specific areas of state activity that were vital for maintaining 
and protecting state sovereignty.  It was a difficulty that contributed 
 
 60 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941) (holding that 
Congress could ban the transportation of goods manufactured by firms whose em-
ployees’ wages and hours did not meet the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act). 
 61 Id. at 124. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Bybee, supra note 15, at 557–59. 
 64 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 65 Id. at 845, 852 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Id. at 845. 
 67 Bybee, supra note 15, at 558.   The Court recognized that although Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power is plenary, the Constitution limits that power insofar as it is 
used to regulate the states.  Id.; Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. 
 68 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851–52. 
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to the overruling of National League of Cities by Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority.69 
In Garcia, the Court effectively abandoned the attempt to shield 
the states from intrusive federal regulation.70  Even though the fed-
eral law at issue in Garcia dictating certain wage and hour conditions 
to the states was similar to the law in National League of Cities, the 
Court upheld it.71  In so ruling, the Court “eliminated the Tenth 
Amendment as a viable defense for the states against federal interven-
tion,” which in turn left the states without any constitutional defenses 
against national regulation of state governmental functions.72  Ac-
cording to the Court, any limits on the federal government’s power 
to invade state functions had to come from the political process.73  
Critics, however, saw this decision as abandoning a fundamental con-
stitutional doctrine, as well as relegating states to a “trivial role” in the 
constitutional system.74 
In his Garcia opinion, Justice Blackmun adopted a view of state-
federal sovereignty contrary to the view that prevailed during the 
constitutional period.  He noted that the “sovereignty of the States is 
limited by the Constitution itself,” and that whatever sovereign au-
thority the states possess is “only to the extent that the Constitution 
has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those 
powers to the Federal Government.”75  This narrow view of state sov-
ereignty contradicted the views of James Madison.  According to 
Madison, the “powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
Federal Government, are few and defined,” while those retained by 
the states are “numerous and indefinite.”76  Madison further asserted 
that the “powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the 
 
 69 469 U.S. at 531 (holding that Congress could subject the states to generally ap-
plicable employment regulations enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause). 
 70 Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 71 Id. at 555–56 (majority opinion). 
 72 Michael P. Lee, How Clear is Clear?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 259 (1998).  In Gar-
cia, the Court found the “traditional governmental functions” test to be unworkable.  
469 U.S. at 546–47.  Contrary to Usery, the Garcia Court found that it could no longer 
distinguish between states acting as governments and states acting as proprietors.  
Bybee, supra note 15, at 559. 
 73 The Court noted that it was extremely difficult to define the nature and con-
tent of any restrictions imposed by the Tenth Amendment.  Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.  
For this reason, the Court concluded that the role and independence of the states 
was to be protected not by judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amendment but by the 
very nature of the political process, in which state actors played a prominent and in-
fluential role.  Id. at 550. 
 74 WALKER, supra note 1, at 187. 
 75 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548, 549. 
 76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
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objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, lib-
erties and properties of the people.”77 
Extending its Garcia ruling, the Court in South Carolina v. Baker78 
held that the Tenth Amendment limits “are structural, not substan-
tive—i.e., that States must find their protection from congressional 
regulation through the national political process.”79  Although the 
Court in Baker acknowledged that “extraordinary defects” in the po-
litical process might actually trigger some Tenth Amendment protec-
tions, it failed to explain what might constitute such a defect.80 
B. The Rehnquist Court’s Revival of Federalism 
1. The Tenth Amendment Decisions 
According to many commentators, the Rehnquist Court has 
made its most significant accomplishment in the area of federalism.81  
After almost sixty years of dormancy, federalism made a constitu-
 
 77 Id. 
 78 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 79 Id. at 512.  The nationalist-orientation of the Court could also be seen in its 
decisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a federal cause of action for viola-
tions of federal rights under color of state law.  In 1978, the Court reversed a previ-
ous ruling that a municipality could not be sued under § 1983.  Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (overturning Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961)).  Later, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980), the Court 
held that in § 1983 suits municipalities may not assert good faith as a defense.  In the 
area of municipal antitrust liability, the Burger Court further handicapped states and 
municipalities by imposing on them various types of antitrust liability.  Up until the 
1970s, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had been applied to private parties and corpora-
tions.  But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Court applied the Act to the public 
sector, finding various municipalities liable for antitrust violations.  See City of Lafay-
ette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (ruling that the city of Boulder’s moratorium on ca-
ble television expansion was subject to antitrust scrutiny). 
 80 Baker, 485 U.S. at 512.  On the political front, federalism was also being af-
fected by changes in the political party structure.  Up until the 1960s, political parties 
had generally served as a decentralizing force, focusing debate and political conflict 
at the state and local levels.  WALKER, supra note 1, at 32.  However, centralizing 
forces have significantly eroded state and local power and influence in the parties.  
Id.  Thus, national party organizations are now “stronger than they have ever been.”  
Id. at 33. 
 81 Although, one scholar has described the Court’s federalism decisions as just 
“puppy federalism” (as analogized to puppy love, being a mere distant imitation of 
the real thing).  MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 56 (2003) (citing 
Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38 (2001)). 
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tional comeback in the 1990s.82  Describing this federalism revolution, 
two noted constitutional scholars have written: 
 Federalism has become the defining issue of the Rehnquist 
Court.  To the extent that its five Justice conservative majority has 
changed American constitutional law, its reasoning in re-defining 
the balance of power between the national government and the 
states will likely prove to be what the Rehnquist court is best 
known for.83 
According to another commentator, the Rehnquist Court “has exer-
cised judicial review aggressively, issuing decisions that have reinvigo-
rated the doctrine of federalism and restored power to the states.”84  
In the past decade or so, “there has been a slow but steady trend to-
wards curbing the power of the federal government under the limita-
tions of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amend-
ment.”85 
Since the 1990s, the Court has “assumed an aggressive stance in 
safeguarding states from perceived overreaching by the federal gov-
ernment.”86  In striking down various federal actions, the Court has 
“revived the effort to demarcate proper spheres of authority between 
the federal and state governments and to provide constitutional heft 
to federalism after a period where the constitutional boundaries were 
lowered.”87  According to the New York Times, a “hallmark of the 
 
 82 The Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions have been described as the “new 
federalism.”  Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding 
the Proper Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 
725 (2005).  This “new federalism” attempts to counter the long drift toward an im-
balanced system greatly favoring the national government over the states.  It also 
seeks to recognize the fact that for most of American history the states have been the 
chief architects “of the welter of servicing, financial, institutional, and jurisdictional 
arrangements” of the public sector.  WALKER, supra note 1, at 249.  States have also 
“provided the means by which most of domestic U.S. governance is conducted and 
nearly all domestic policies are implemented.”  Id. 
 83 Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause after Morrison, 
25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843, 844 (2000). 
 84 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 659 
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)). 
 85 Robert Ward Shaw, Comment, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental 
Shifts in Federalism, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1195, 1217 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 86 A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 305 
(2003). 
 87 Id.  Besides its more restrictive interpretation of enumerated powers, the 
Rehnquist Court on occasion prevented Congress from creating new civil rights that 
might trump state laws or policies under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court ruled that Congress could not require the states to 
give more protections to religious exercise than the Constitution gave.  521 U.S. 507, 
534–36 (1997).  The Boerne ruling was later relied on to overturn other acts of Con-
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Rehnquist Court has been a re-examination of the country’s most ba-
sic constitutional arrangements, resulting in decisions that demanded 
a new respect for the sovereignty of the states and placed correspond-
ing restrictions on the powers of Congress.”88 
The Rehnquist Court waged its federalism revolution through 
three different constitutional approaches.  It expanded state sover-
eign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  It narrowed the 
scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.  And it revived the 
Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional power. 
In New York v. United States,89 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
federalism principles contained in the Tenth Amendment prohibited 
Congress from enacting legislation forcing state legislatures to admin-
ister a federal regulatory program.90  At issue were provisions of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LRWP Act), which required 
states to either adopt a federal regulatory program or be held finan-
cially responsible for damages as owners of the waste.91  In striking 
down this law, the Court held that by failing to provide the states with 
the choice not to regulate, the law “crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion,” thus violating the Tenth Amend-
ment.92  Finding that the LRWP Act was an attempt by Congress to 
use the States as “implements of regulation,”93 the Court ruled that 
 
gress.  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 
the Court overturned a federal statute making states liable to private parties for pat-
ent infringement and violations of the Lanham Act.  527 U.S. 627, 637–48 (1999).  In 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Court prohibited Congress, under 
the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment, from exposing states to private lawsuits al-
leging age and disability discrimination under federal law. 
 88 Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States’ Rights Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR 9303554.  Despite this attempt 
by the Court to strengthen state sovereignty, however, not all decisions went in favor 
of the states.  In Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005), for instance, the 
Court upheld the power of Congress to ban the use of marijuana for medical pur-
poses, even in states that permitted it. 
 89 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 90 Id. at 188. 
 91 Id. at 175–77.  The act stated that any state that failed to clean up its nuclear 
waste by 1986 would be deemed to be responsible for the waste and would be liable 
for any harms it had caused.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2000), invalidated by 
New York, 505 U.S. 144. 
 92 New York, 505 U.S. at 175, 149–54.  In explaining its decision, the Court first 
noted that unlike previous Tenth Amendment cases, New York did not involve a law 
of general applicability.  Id. at 160–61.  Thus, the Court found that the law attempted 
to regulate states directly, rather than through the impact of generally applicable 
laws.  Id. at 176–77. 
 93 Id. at 161. 
GARRY FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  3:24:33 PM 
2006] A ONE-SIDED FEDERALISM REVOLUTION 869 
the Tenth Amendment is violated when Congress “commandeers” 
the states by forcing them to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program.94  Although the LRWP Act left the states with the choice of 
accepting title to hazardous waste or regulating according to the 
mandates of the Act, this choice was constitutionally deficient since 
the first option commandeered state governments for federal pur-
poses, while the second basically mandated that state governments 
implement specific federal legislation.95  By infringing on the core of 
state sovereignty, the Act, according to Justice O’Connor, was “incon-
sistent with the federal structure of our Government established by 
the Constitution.”96 
In Printz v. United States, the Court extended its ruling in New 
York by holding that the Tenth Amendment forbade Congress from 
enforcing certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act.97  The Brady Act required state law enforcement personnel 
to participate in a federal regulatory program by conducting back-
ground checks and processing handgun applications before issuing 
any firearm permits.98  As it had done in New York, the Court in Printz 
ruled that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to 
implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory pro-
grams.”99  According to the Court, the federal government could “nei-
ther issue directives requiring the States to address particular prob-
lems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program,” since such commands violated the “con-
stitutional system of dual sovereignty.”100 
Examining the issue from an historical perspective, Justice 
Scalia’s decision focused on the “structure of the Constitution,” see-
ing in it an “essential postulate” of state sovereignty.101  In laying out a 
view of state sovereignty much broader than the view given by Justice 
Blackmun in Garcia, Justice Scalia wrote that although “the states sur-
rendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they 
retained a ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” that is “reflected 
 
 94 Id. at 176. 
 95 Id. at 175–77. 
 96 New York, 505 U.S. at 177. 
 97 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 98 Id. at 902–04. 
 99 Id. at 925.  The Brady Act was therefore unconstitutional because it forced state 
executive officials to enforce federal laws.  Id. at 933–35. 
 100 Id. at 935.  Justice Scalia found that Congress had essentially conscripted state 
and local governments to carry out a congressional mandate, and that this conscrip-
tion encroached on state sovereignty.  Id. 
 101 Printz, 521 U.S. at 918. 
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throughout the Constitution’s text.”102  According to Scalia, the Con-
stitution embodies a “dual sovereignty” that prohibits the federal 
government from acting “upon and through the States.”103 
2. Commerce Power Limitations 
In two major Commerce Clause cases, in which individuals chal-
lenged the exercise of federal power, the Rehnquist Court held that 
Congress lacked the authority to intrude upon matters of state and 
local law enforcement.104  In each case, the Court held that Congress 
could exercise only those powers enumerated in Article I.105  It also 
narrowed the scope of Congress’s Article I Commerce Clause powers, 
holding that Congress may only regulate economic activity that has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.106  Through such rulings, 
the Court sought to curtail broad-reaching congressional regulations 
that would be incompatible with “our dual system of government.”107 
In United States v. Lopez, for the first time since the New Deal, the 
Supreme Court nullified a congressional enactment under the 
Commerce Clause.108  That enactment outlawed the possession of any 
firearm within 1000 feet of a school.109  Striking down this prohibi-
tion, the Court held that the possession of guns near schools was not 
an activity constituting commerce and hence was not within the scope 
of the commerce power.110  In so ruling, the Court restricted the 
scope of the Commerce Clause to the regulation of those activities 
 
 102 Id. at 918–19 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; art. IV, §§ 2–4; art. V). 
 103 Id. 
 104 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995). 
 105 Although the Court may have revived judicial review of the Commerce Clause, 
it continues “to construe the Spending Clause to provide nearly a blank check for 
any spending that Congress chooses to undertake and to permit Congress to impose 
regulatory conditions that may parallel those barred by its Commerce Clause juris-
prudence.” McGinnis & Somin, supra note 39, at 115 (footnote omitted).  See also Sa-
bri v. United States, 540 U.S. 600 (2004) (upholding the imposition of various condi-
tions on the granting of federal funds to states); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987). 
 106 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 107 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
 108 Prior to 1937, the Court had struck down an array of congressional Commerce 
Clause enactments, usually on the grounds that those enactments undermined the 
police power of the states.  See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).  But in 1937, the 
Court reversed course and substantially expanded Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 109 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 110 Id. at 561. 
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having a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.111  It also recog-
nized that some areas of “historical” state powers, including family 
law, criminal law enforcement, and education are beyond Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause.112 
Continuing in the Lopez vein, the Court in United States v. Morri-
son struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act.113  The Court ruled that the commerce power can apply 
only to an “economic endeavor,”114 and that gender-motivated violent 
crimes “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”115  Ac-
cording to the Court, the Violence Against Women Act regulated not 
economic behavior such as commercial transactions, but conduct that 
has traditionally been left to state law.116  As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote, the Constitution “requires a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local.”117  Thus, contrary to Garcia, the Mor-
rison opinion reflected a “deep-seated respect for states as sover-
eigns.”118 
3. State Sovereign Immunity 
The third focus of the Rehnquist Court regarding the doctrinal 
development of the new federalism was the expansion of state sover-
eign immunity.  The Court did this in connection with lawsuits 
against states in both state and federal courts.  Through its Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has indicated that state sover-
eign immunity from private suits is critical to state autonomy.119 
In Alden v. Maine,120 the Court addressed suits in state court, rul-
ing that sovereign immunity prevented Congress from compelling 
states to defend federal claims in state courts.121  In his majority deci-
sion, Justice Kennedy discussed the need to protect state sovereignty 
from nonconsensual suits: 
 
 111 Id. at 565, 558–59. 
 112 Id. at 564. 
 113 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 114 Id. at 611. 
 115 Id. at 613.  Thus, the Court held that the civil damages provision of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 617–
19. 
 116 Id. at 617–18. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Grey, supra note 35, at 497. 
 119 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 59 (1996) (rejecting the 
assertion that Congress, through its Article I powers, could subject the states to pri-
vate federal suits). 
 120 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 121 Id. at 758–60. 
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 The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the 
sovereign status of the States in two ways.  First, it reserves to them 
a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together 
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. . . . 
 Second, even as to matters within the competence of the Na-
tional Government, the constitutional design secures the found-
ing generation’s rejection of “the concept of a central govern-
ment that would act upon and through the States” in favor of “a 
system in which the State and Federal Governments would exer-
cise concurrent authority over the people—who were, in Hamil-
ton’s words, ‘the only proper objects of government.’”122 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion relied heavily on the general 
state sovereignty principle, which he argued pervades the constitu-
tional text: “[S]overeign immunity derives not from the Eleventh 
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution it-
self.”123 
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,124 the Court continued this ex-
pansion of state immunity.  Addressing the issue of whether states can 
be sued by their employees under federal laws prohibiting age dis-
crimination, the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers when 
it abrogated the states’ immunity from suits brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.125  And in a later case, the Court 
ruled that Congress again intruded upon state sovereign immunity 
when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990.126 
The Court has also used the Eleventh Amendment to immunize 
states from suits in federal court.  In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor-
ida127 the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which gave 
Congress broad powers to override the Eleventh Amendment.128  In 
Seminole Tribe, the Court substantially restricted the power of Con-
gress to authorize suits against state governments.129  Relying heavily 
 
 122 Id. at 714 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997)). 
 123 Id. at 728. 
 124 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 125 Id. at 91. 
 126 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 127 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). 
 128 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 129 517 U.S. at 65–66.  Seminole Tribe held that Congress did not have the power to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its Article I powers.  
Id. at 72. 
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on the Eleventh Amendment, the Court referred to it as the textual 
embodiment of the principle of state sovereign immunity.130 
These sovereign immunity decisions indicate the Court’s belief 
that such immunity is critical to protecting the states as autonomous 
sovereigns.131  According to Professor Althouse, the real concern “is to 
protect the states as independently functioning government institu-
tions by sparing them the impact of accumulated liability for their 
past violations of law.”132  In a more recent expansion of the sovereign 
immunity doctrine, the Court held that sovereign immunity also ap-
plied to adjudications in federal administrative agencies.133 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF FEDERALISM 
A. A Structural Provision 
Through its recent federalism decisions, the Court is “resurrect-
ing and restoring a [constitutional structure] that it erroneously 
abandoned in the years after 1937.”134  A diverse and decentralized 
governmental structure, divided between the layers of state, local and 
nation, offers an array of benefits, the most compelling of which is 
the protection of individual liberty.135  The Constitution’s embodi-
 
 130 Id. at 64.  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Sav-
ings Bank, the Court held that state governments cannot be sued for patent violations 
in federal court.  527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999). 
 131 Grey, supra note 35, at 500. 
 132 Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 245, 265 (2000).  But not all Court decisions on state immunity have 
gone in favor of the states.  See Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the 
ability of state employees to sue under the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee 
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding the application of the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act to state courthouses).  By ruling that states could be sued for failing to 
make their courthouses accessible, the Court rejected the states’ claim of constitu-
tional immunity from suit.  Also, in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), the Court affirmed the authority 
of the federal Environmental Protection Agency over state regulators, despite the 
dissent of Justice Kennedy on federalism grounds.  Id. at 502; id. at 502–03 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
 133 See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751–53 (2002) 
(using the Alden reasoning to derive sovereign immunity from the general principle 
of state sovereignty). 
 134 Kramer, supra note 9, at 290. 
 135 Historically, it has been believed that individual liberty would be served by di-
viding and decentralizing government power.  As the Court explained in New York v. 
United States: federalism “‘secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffu-
sion of sovereign power.’”  505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  The Court also stated that a 
“‘healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will re-
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ment of the structural principles of federalism is designed not just to 
create a workable government but to create one that protects indi-
vidual rights.136  Federalism works in combination with another struc-
tural provision of the Constitution—the separation of powers—to 
produce a system with two different levels of checks and balances: 
one existing between the national and state governments, and the 
other between the three branches of the federal government.  This 
system reflects what Madison called the Constitution’s “double secu-
rity” for individual rights.137 
Federalism reflects a structural aspect of the constitutional 
scheme because it deals not with a specific power or right enjoyed by 
a specific actor, but with the organization of the American republic 
and the relationship between governmental units.138  Federalism 
represents those limitations on government power that are both ex-
plicit in the text of the Constitution and implicit in the structure of 
the Constitution—a structure based on the different spheres of fed-
eral and state authority.139  The system of dual sovereignty between 
national and state governments was designed largely to create a gov-
ernment that would protect the liberty of its citizens.140 
 
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”  Id. (quoting Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
 136 Amar, supra note 2, at 1426.  An advantage of federalism is that people of dif-
ferent views can gather in different states with different policies.  In a way, federalism 
can be seen as conducive to or even responsible for the revolution in sexual rights, 
because people have been able to move to the locales most hospitable to their par-
ticular orientations or proclivities. 
 137 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 67 (James Madison) (Lester DeKoster ed., 1976).  
The interstate competition fostered by federalism can also promote liberty.  The abil-
ity of citizens to move from one state to another, to “vote with their feet . . . will dis-
cipline government in the same way in which consumer choice . . . disciplines pro-
ducers.”  MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD 
HAPPEN 3 (1999).  In this same way, the competitive system of federalism devised by 
the Framers “leads to the protection of liberty” by allowing citizens to move from a 
state where they feel tyrannized to one with less tyrannous laws.  Calabresi, supra note 
20, at 776. 
 138 Federalism, in other words, describes the type of governmental structure laid 
out in the Constitution—a structure of state-retained powers later codified in the 
Tenth Amendment.  Amar, supra note 2, at 1440.  The Tenth Amendment is not 
about reserving power to the states so that they can administer themselves as gov-
ernments, but an amendment expressing a relationship among the federal govern-
ment, the states, and the people.  Bybee, supra note 15, at 561. 
 139 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999) (citing both the constitutional 
text and the implications of the “constitutional design” as the legal basis for federal-
ism). 
 140 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); see also Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of the [federal and state governments] is 
one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 
at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that governmental 
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To the Framers, the primary justification of federalism was not 
diversity or state competition, but the role of the states as guardians 
against possible federal tyranny.141  By diluting the power of the cen-
tralized national government, federalism restricts the opportunities 
for the abuse of power.  Furthermore, by maintaining a separate gov-
ernmental watchdog layer in the states, federalism provides a built-in 
mechanism to combat any overreaching by the national govern-
ment.142  The Framers believed that the states could mount popular 
uprisings against any tyrannical abuses by the national government.143  
Alexander Hamilton argued that individuals who felt their rights vio-
lated by the central government could use the state governments “as 
the instrument of redress.”144  Indeed, the prevailing expectation dur-
ing the constitutional period was that “when one’s rivals or enemies 
were in control of the central government, one was prone to savor 
states’ rights”145 
In The Federalist Nos. 9 and 51, Hamilton makes a clear distinction 
between a free government and a republican government.146  Whereas 
free government focuses exclusively on securing specified individual 
rights, republican government tries to achieve political freedom as a 
 
power “is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allot-
ted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people.”). 
 141 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179–180 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that the states “will in all possible contingencies afford 
complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority”); 
see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION xiii 
(1998) (arguing that bolstering the states as bulwarks against federal tyranny was the 
primary motivation behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights). 
 142 The Framers believed that the states would serve to check any encroachments 
by the national government on the liberties of the people.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 322–23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 143 Kramer, supra note 9, at 215.  Similarly, the modern Court’s resurgent interest 
in preserving federalism is driven by a “concern for individual liberty.”  William H. 
Pryor, Madison’s Double Security, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1177 (2002).  As Justice 
O’Connor stated, the Constitution “does not protect the sovereignty of States for the 
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,” but rather 
“for the protection of individuals.”  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 
(1992). 
 144 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 145 FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 
1776–1876, at 48 (2000). 
 146 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 9, 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (referencing the dis-
tinction between free governments and republican governments). 
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means to securing individual freedom.147  In choosing the latter, the 
Framers saw the structure of government as the best protection of in-
dividual rights.148  Their objective was to design the proper govern-
mental arrangements that would preserve liberty.149  To the Framers, 
“the primary safeguards against government tyranny were architec-
tural.”150  Infringements on liberty caused by a potentially tyrannical 
national government could best be prevented by state governments 
standing “ready to rally their citizens and lead them in opposition.”151 
For a century and a half, the Framers’ commitment to federalism 
persevered in constitutional doctrine.  But the Framers’ view of pro-
tecting liberty through a limited and divided government was largely 
abandoned by the New Deal reformers, who called upon a powerful 
and activist central government to combat the problems of the Great 
Depression.152  Unlike the Framers, the New Dealers believed they 
could preserve liberty strictly through the judiciary’s enforcement of 
specified individual freedoms.153 
As a result of the transformations brought on by the New Deal, a 
constitutional compromise or settlement was reached.  In order to 
sustain the sweeping New Deal legislation, judicial review of federal-
ism issues more or less ended.154  Congress was given great deference 
to enact the kind of legislation that would have previously been 
judged a violation of the federalism doctrine.155  However, this aban-
donment of federalism undercut one of the most fundamental requi-
sites of individual liberty.  To compensate for this erasure of constitu-
tional protection, the Court made a compromise: although it would 
retreat from reviewing federalism issues, it would intensify its review 
of individual rights issues.  Larry Kramer calls this the New Deal “set-
tlement,” in which the Court decided to enforce rigorously a selective 
set of substantive individual rights while deferring to Congress in 
 
 147 Bradford P. Wilson, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review, in SEPARATION OF 
POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 63, 68 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm 
eds., 1994). 
 148 Id. 
 149 WALKER, supra note 1, at 56.  A federalist structure would help protect “‘the 
rights of every class of citizens.’”  Id. at 57. 
 150 Levinson, supra note 25, at 919. 
 151 Id. at 938.  But this ability was possible only if courts preserved the constitu-
tional structure that gave state governments considerable influence and leverage 
over federal officials to prevent federal overreaching.  Id. 
 152 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the 
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 483–84 (1997). 
 153 See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 424. 
 154 See cases and discussion supra notes 52, 59, 60. 
 155 See cases and discussion supra notes 52, 59, 60. 
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structural matters, such as federalism and separation of powers.156  Ju-
dicial passivity in one area would be offset by activism in another.157  
Thus, a deferential posture in connection with federalism and separa-
tion of powers coincided with the rise of a new version of substantive 
due process underlying a new judicial assertiveness in civil liberties 
cases. 
As early as 1937, the Court articulated a “preferred-freedoms” 
approach calling for heightened constitutional protection of individ-
ual rights “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental.”158  A year later, in footnote four to his 
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,159 Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone argued that the Court should protect the personal rights out-
lined in the Bill of Rights more zealously than property or economic 
rights.160  It was this doctrine, which suggested a greater protection of 
individual rights than of any other constitutional provisions, that pro-
vided the foundation on which the Court would later construct the 
right to privacy.161  This heightened protection of individual rights 
also provided a substitute for judicial review of structural issues, and 
led to a gradual incorporation of the Bill of Rights guarantees into 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thereby generating a new body of substantive due proc-
ess in the civil liberties area.162 
 
 156 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 219–20 (2004).  Because of this “settlement,” federalism became a 
dead doctrine until the Rehnquist Court.  WALKER, supra note 1, at 96. 
 157 WALKER, supra note, 1 at 97. 
 158 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 159 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 160 Id. at 152–53 n.4 (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a spe-
cific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth.”). 
 161 Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off the Right of Privacy: Sex and the 
Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 945 (2005). 
 162 WALKER, supra note 1, at 96.  The preferred status given to individual rights 
over structural matters, however, is not accorded to property rights.  The court seems 
concerned with individual rights only when they arise within the context of some 
kind of prohibited discrimination.  Thus, courts have allowed the expansion of in-
stances in which the government can commandeer private property through the 
process of eminent domain.  See, e.g., Mary Massaron Ross, Public Use: Does County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock Signal a Revival of the Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Prop-
erty?, 37 URB. LAW. 243 (2005).  Immigration and naturalization cases present yet an-
other example of the preferred position given review of individual rights issues.  
Normally, the Court grants deference to Congress on immigration and naturalization 
matters, which fall within the field of foreign affairs, but an exception is made in 
GARRY FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  3:24:33 PM 
878 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:851 
The civil rights movement solidified the transformation in con-
stitutional approaches to the preservation of liberty: from relying on 
the structural provisions of the Constitution to using the courts to en-
force substantive individual rights.163  But this transformation essen-
tially turned majority rule and individual liberty into antagonists.  It 
exalted the protection of individual rights as the primary purpose of 
constitutional law.164  Lost was the notion that if government power 
was constrained it could not infringe on liberty.  Lost was the belief 
that a limited government of checks and balances could provide a 
lasting and supportive environment for individual liberty.  Instead, 
the Court focused near exclusively on protecting specific, substantive 
rights, carving them out of and immunizing them from the political 
process. 
In the legal culture of the late twentieth century, judicial review 
by an undemocratic court came to be seen as the only way to protect 
civil liberties.165  Individual rights required judicial supremacy and ex-
clusivity.  But it was only after the New Deal and the judicial activism 
of the Warren Court that America came to rely only on the judiciary 
for the protection of individual rights.166  “Only during the past two 
generations have lawyers and judges succeeded in placing judicial re-
view at the center” of the protection of individual liberty.167 
The bifurcated pattern of judicial review that resulted from the 
New Deal “settlement”‘ was revealed in a 1978 study conducted by 
Professor Arthur Hellman.168  Professor Hellman found that during 
the six terms from 1971 through 1976, forty-three percent of the Su-
preme Court’s cases involved the principal issue of individual 
 
cases involving individuals asserting various types of due process challenges to Immi-
gration and Naturalization Services orders.  See generally Melissa A. Flynn, Case Com-
ment, Separation of Powers: Permissive Judicial Review or Invasion of Congressional Power?: 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 54 FLA. L. REV. 989 (2002).  In such cases, the 
courts again tend to ignore separation of powers issues and rule in favor of specific 
individual rights. 
 163 Levinson, supra note 25, at 971. 
 164 Id. at 972. 
 165 Hulsebosch, supra note 84, at 658.  Much of the legal academy favors the rela-
tively recent norm of expansive readings of the Bill of Rights.  Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Branches Behaving Badly: The Predictable and Often Desirable Consequences of the Separation 
of Powers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 546 (2003).  Substantive individual rights 
appear to be the only place where the legal academy favors limitations on govern-
ment. 
 166 Hulsebosch, supra note 84, at 660. 
 167 Id. at 662. 
 168 Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 
1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1978). 
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rights.169  Compared with the 383 decisions involving individual rights 
during this period, the Court handed down only eight decisions in 
which the principal issue was either a question of federalism or 
whether Congress had exceeded its constitutionally delegated pow-
ers.170 
Other scholars and commentators have documented this skewed 
focus of the Court that greatly favors individual rights cases over fed-
eralism or separation of powers cases.171  Mary Ann Glendon argues 
that prior to the 1950s the principal focus of constitutional law was 
not on personal liberty, but on the division of authority between the 
states and the federal government and the allocation of powers 
among the branches of the federal government.172  A half-century ago, 
the Court saw far fewer cases involving individual rights claims; today, 
however, those kinds of cases make up the bulk of the Court’s consti-
tutional workload.173 
The judicial preference for substantive individual rights over 
structural matters can presently be seen through cases involving the 
due process rights of alleged enemy combatants.  In Rasul v. Bush,174 
the Court addressed the issue of whether habeas corpus should be 
available to foreign nationals detained abroad in connection with the 
U.S. war on terror.175  This inquiry, however, triggered the larger is-
sues of what due process rights are possessed by those accused of be-
ing enemy combatants and whether the detention of enemy combat-
 
 169 Id. at 1741.  The number of individual rights cases was nearly double the num-
ber the Court had heard during the 1959–1964 period.  Id. at 1750. 
 170 Id. at 1761. 
 171 This skewed focus is evident in the Court’s handling of deportation orders of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 
(2001).  Even though Congress has exclusive power to legislate in the area of immi-
gration and naturalization, U.S. CONST. art I, §8, cl. 4, and even though Congress has 
delegated some of those powers to the executive branch (the INS), the Court has 
taken a judicially active and intrusive stance to immigration matters that affect or in-
volve issues of individual rights.  Rather than showing deference to Congress and to 
separation of powers concerns, the Court has actively reviewed and scrutinized con-
gressional laws dealing with the INS’s detention of deportable aliens.  See Zadvyas, 
533 U.S. at 682. 
 172 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 4 (1991) (arguing that the traditional theory was that individual freedom 
was protected mainly through these structural features of our political regime). 
 173 Id. at 5.  As the Supreme Court began in the 1950s to expand the constitu-
tional protection of a broad range of personal rights, judicial review was used, in-
stead of democratic processes, to protect individual rights and check majoritarian 
rule.  Id. at 38.  The great expansion of personal liberties and civil rights began in the 
post-World War II period.  Id. at 163. 
 174 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 175 Id. at 475. 
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ants falls under the sole authority of the President and Congress—
hence falling outside the scope of judicial review.176  Even though the 
great weight of constitutional precedent indicated that military de-
tainees did not possess due process rights177 and that military detain-
ees could not use habeas corpus, the Court in Rasul held that U.S. 
courts do have jurisdiction to hear such petitions.178  Thus, Rasul pro-
vides an embodiment of the post-1937 judicial trend: rigorously re-
viewing matters of substantive individual rights, while largely ignoring 
structural issues.  In essence, the conflict in Rasul was a separation of 
powers dispute between the executive’s authority in military affairs 
and the judiciary’s interest in protecting substantive individual rights, 
with the Court elevating the latter over the former. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,179 the Court likewise held that a U.S. citizen 
detained as an enemy combatant (captured in Afghanistan while 
fighting with a Taliban military unit) could not only challenge the 
circumstances of his detention before a court, but could present ar-
guments against his detention.180  In dissent, Justice Thomas argued 
that the constitutional authority of the President to wage war and 
protect the security interests of America took priority over the per-
ceived authority of the courts.181  According to Justice Thomas, deci-
sions regarding detained enemy combatants are decisions given ex-
 
 176 See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“Where a power has been committed to a particular Branch of the 
Government in the text of the Constitution, the balance already has been struck by 
the Constitution itself.”).  The Bush administration argued that the power to detain 
enemy combatants was inherent in the commander-in-chief’s power and thus should 
not be subject to a balancing of the competing constitutional interests of other 
branches.  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475. 
 177 See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the U.S. civil 
courts have no jurisdiction over non-citizen enemy fighters captured and held in for-
eign territory); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (denying leave to file petitions 
for habeas corpus when several suspected saboteurs (including one U.S. citizen) 
sought review of their detentions).  As Justice Jackson explained in Eisentrager: “Ex-
ecutive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been 
deemed, throughout our history, essential to wartime security.”  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
at 774; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(holding that the President should have broad latitude in the context of foreign pol-
icy). 
 178 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473. 
 179 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 180 Id. at 509 (holding that due process demands that “an enemy combatant be 
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before 
a neutral decisionmaker”). 
 181 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the subject “detention falls 
squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and 
capacity to second-guess that decision.  As such, petitioners’ habeas challenge should 
fail . . . .”). 
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clusively by the Constitution to Congress and the President; nowhere 
does the Constitution give authority to the courts over war-related 
matters.182 
B. Judicial Balancing of Structure and Individual Rights 
Within the constitutional scheme, there has emerged an inverse 
relationship between the enforcement of substantive individual rights 
and that of structural provisions such as federalism and separation of 
powers.  As the courts have abandoned the latter, they have had to in-
tensify the former.  In the words of one commentator, “[t]he decline 
of federalism and the rise of judicial supremacy, in short, are the op-
posite sides of a single coin.”183 
When the Court ceases to protect the kind of governmental 
structure designed to guard individual liberty, then only the judiciary 
is left to act as the guardian of liberty—and it does so by carving out 
and rigidly enforcing individual substantive rights.  This practice of 
strict review of individual rights cases and lenient review of structural 
cases came into full flower during the 1960s,184 when the Warren and 
Burger Courts effected a constitutional revolution in many areas of 
substantive individual rights, including criminal justice,185 race dis-
crimination,186 the First Amendment,187 abortion,188 the rights of 
women,189 the death penalty,190 and procedural due process.191 
 
 182 Id.  Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s decision took the Court out of the 
modest and limited role it held in a democratic society.  Id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 183 Michael Uhlmann, Wretched Judicial Excess, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2002, at 49 (re-
viewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001)). 
 184 Michael B. Rappaport, It’s the O’Connor Court: A Brief Discussion of Some Critiques 
of the Rehnquist Court and Their Implications for Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
369, 375 (2004) (“[T]he two-tiered approach of vigorous judicial review concerning 
individual rights, but deferential review of structural matters, is of relatively recent 
vintage.”). 
 185 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating new procedural safeguards 
for criminal defendants subjected to custodial interrogation). 
 186 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s ban on interra-
cial marriage). 
 187 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting the liability of 
defendants in a defamation action). 
 188 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a constitutional right to abor-
tion). 
 189 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down gender-based discrimina-
tion). 
 190 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (ruling that the death penalty 
as applied under the Alabama statute at issue was unconstitutional), superseded by stat-
ute, ALA. CODE § 13-11-9 (1975), repealed by ALA. CODE § 13A-5-57 (1982). 
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Today, the Supreme Court is widely viewed as the sole guarantor 
of individual liberties.192  But in the Framers’ view, the primary secu-
rity for rights lay in the Constitution’s structural features, such as fed-
eralism.  Contrary to the claim that individual rights should be en-
forced more strictly than structural provisions,193 other scholars have 
shown that the Framers did intend significant review of structural 
matters.194  During the constitutional period, the protection of indi-
vidual liberty through judicial review of substantive individual rights 
was rarely mentioned, primarily because the Framers relied more on 
the structural provisions of the Constitution to check government 
abuses than on judicially created rights that serve as trump-cards on 
the democratic process.195 
Contemporary conventional wisdom in constitutional law holds 
that individual rights are more in need of judicial protection than are 
the structural provisions of the Constitution.  But there is good rea-
son to think that just the opposite is true.  Because citizens are often 
more immediately focused on their substantive liberties than on fed-
eralism, “judicial review may be more necessary to restrain govern-
ment agents from violating the Constitution’s structural provisions 
than provisions relating to individual rights.”196  For this reason, 
courts should enforce the federalism provisions of the Constitution 
“no less than they do the Constitution’s individual rights provi-
sions.”197  As one commentator has recognized, democratic freedoms 
are “inevitably conditioned by the entire institutional structure within 
which these [freedoms] exist.”198  Indeed, the way in which federalism 
acts as a guardian of individual rights was illustrated by Jonah Gold-
berg, using the analogy of college dorms: 
Imagine you’ve got ten dorms on a campus and a student popula-
tion divided up into the usual coalitions: stoners, partiers, jocks, 
and so forth on one side, and study geeks, exchange students . . . 
on the other.  A purely democratic system where all students get 
 
 191 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a termination of welfare 
benefits requires a due process hearing). 
 192 Uhlmann, supra note 183, at 49. 
 193 See KRAMER, supra note 156, at 81–82, 125 (arguing that vigorous judicial review 
can occur with individual rights, but should not occur with structural matters).  In 
Kramer’s view, the New Deal settlement was that judicial review was legitimate in in-
dividual rights cases, but not in cases involving structural issues.  Id. at 162–65. 
 194 Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887, 927–81 (2003). 
 195 Kramer, supra note 9, at 266. 
 196 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 39, at 97. 
 197 Id. at 90. 
 198 Pildes, supra note 40, at 52. 
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to decide dorm policy could result in the tyranny of 51 percent of 
the students over 49 percent of the students.  The party-hardy 
crowd could pass a policy permitting loud music and keg parties 
at all hours of the night.  Or if the more academically rigorous 
coalition won, they could ban “fun” of any kind, ever.  Similarly, if 
the administration imposed its own policy from above, you could 
have a system that makes no one happy. 
 But, if you allowed each individual dorm to vote for its own poli-
cies, you could have a system where some dorms operate like 
scholarly monasteries and other dorms are more fun than a pool 
party at James Caan’s house.  Theoretically, 100 percent of the 
students could live the way they want.199 
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING RIGHTS OVER STRUCTURE 
A. A Disconnect Between Individuals and the Democratic Process 
The Framers favored a structural protection for individual lib-
erty because they did not, and could not, envision the kind of activist 
judiciary needed to ensure liberty through the enforcement of a 
specified set of substantive individual rights.  Yet, aside from this dis-
taste for an activist judiciary, the Framers also hinged the protection 
of liberty on the structural design of the Constitution because they 
saw the democratic process, with sufficient checks and balances, as 
supportive of individual liberty.  To the Framers, the design of gov-
ernment, rather than any enumerated right, constituted the individ-
ual’s primary protection from tyranny by the majority.200 
With federalism and separation of powers providing an internal, 
structural check on the kind of government abuses that could erode 
basic freedoms, a consistency and harmony was seen between indi-
vidual liberty and the workings of the larger democratic society.  
However, as the belief in this connection eroded over the course of 
the late twentieth century, individual rights became isolated ends in 
themselves, disconnected from the structural workings of the consti-
tutional process.  Consequently, the modern notion of individual 
rights tends to be divorced from the larger society.  Rights are charac-
terized by an “exaggerated absoluteness, . . . hyperindividualism, . . . 
 
 199 Jonah Goldberg, Jesusland for Thee, But Not for Me, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041201-060033-
2541r. 
 200 GLENDON, supra note 172, at 24. 
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insularity, and . . . silence with respect to personal, civic, and collec-
tive responsibilities.”201 
By trying to protect liberty solely through the enforcement of 
specified personal freedoms, the lone individual is elevated to the 
pinnacle of the American political and constitutional scheme.202  The 
primary legal drama of recent decades has been the expansion of in-
dividual rights.  In legal education, for instance, “an intense preoccu-
pation with the Bill of Rights and the courts tends to obscure the im-
portant roles that federalism, legislation, and separation of powers 
still can and must play in safeguarding rights and freedom.”203  Not 
only are democratic values downgraded in this process, but the indi-
vidual is placed in constant conflict with the larger society.204 
Individual rights activists adhere to the ideal of imaginary hu-
man beings in a “state of nature.”  But this is not how the Constitu-
tion sees individuals, especially individuals who are members of a 
democratic society.  The Framers did not see human beings as soli-
tary creatures, with no relationships or obligations to society.205  In-
deed, by joining a democratic society, the individual is no longer in a 
“state of nature”; thus, laws should not be crafted as if individuals 
lived separate from society, disconnected to its democratic process.  
However, the current individual rights mentality seems to presume 
that individual freedom cannot truly exist within majoritarian rule, as 
if majoritarian rule is inherently oppressive.  (And indeed, without 
structural provisions like federalism and separation of powers, it 
would be.) 
The Constitution envisions democracy like a family: there must 
be processes within the family structure to give each individual some 
freedom, and yet also to bind each member to the family as a whole.  
An exclusive focus on the individual simply separates that individual 
from the larger family, with no concern for what unites the family.  
That is why the structural framework is so important: to structure the 
larger unit so as to provide both social cohesion and individual free-
dom in a balanced dynamic.  Similarly, the Constitution is primarily 
concerned with the workings of the democratic community, not with 
trying to return individuals to some imaginary “state of nature.” 
 
 201 Id. at x. 
 202 Id. at xi. 
 203 Id. at 5.  According to Glendon, the rights revolution has contributed to the 
weakening of vital local governments, and to the disdain for politics that is now so 
prevalent in America.  Id.  Consequently, activists now often set their agendas in the 
courts rather than in the legislatures. 
 204 Id. 
 205 GLENDON, supra note 172, at 67. 
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Structural provisions not only protect individual liberty, but cre-
ate a framework in which duties and responsibilities can be devel-
oped and fulfilled.  Within the constitutional scheme, that framework 
is the democratic process, which in turn occurs within the structural 
confines of federalism and separation of powers.  Because these struc-
tures allow individuals to integrate within the larger democratic 
process, they facilitate both individual rights and responsibilities. 
If individual rights serve to undermine their structural founda-
tions, then they erode their “surest underpinning.”206  Moreover, the 
reliance on judicial enforcement of substantive rights can foster the 
illusion that the rights in question are more secure than they in fact 
are.  Consider, for instance, the history of property rights in constitu-
tional law.  To the Framers, one of the primary purposes behind the 
new constitution was to develop a governmental structure for the pro-
tection of private property.207  This was considered the single right 
most vulnerable to government infringement.208  But as it turned out, 
property rights were the first casualty of the New Deal transformation 
in constitutional law; they went from being a fundamental freedom to 
being merely a social interest. 
Ironically, the same kind of judicial scrutiny once given to prop-
erty rights is now being given to certain personal liberties like the 
right of privacy.  But contrary to the Court’s current approach to this 
issue, privacy rights are actually better suited to being protected by 
the Constitution’s structural scheme than by judicial dictate.  Struc-
tural protections allow for a more flexible and dynamic protection, 
shaping individual freedoms according to the democratic desires and 
interests of the people possessing those freedoms.  The existing right 
to privacy, however, reflects a judicial mandate on a matter in which 
every citizen has an interest and which continually changes as society 
and social relationships change. 
The development and enforcement of a right to privacy reflects 
the New Deal “settlement” that occurred in constitutional law.  Under 
this settlement, the courts have acquiesced in the shift from a limited 
to an activist government, as long as there is judicial scrutiny of indi-
vidual rights.  This was the theory underlying that shift: that the only 
way to have an activist central government and individual freedom is 
to have the latter imposed by the courts, through the individual rights 
provisions of the Constitution. 
 
 206 Id. at 138. 
 207 Id. at 24–25. 
 208 Id. 
GARRY FINAL.DOC 3/6/2006  3:24:33 PM 
886 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:851 
B. A Freedom Better Left to Structural Protections 
1. Judicial Development of Privacy Rights 
The Court’s recognition of a constitutional right of privacy be-
gan in Griswold v. Connecticut,209 where the Court struck down a Con-
necticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, even by married 
couples.210  The Court ruled that the statute violated “a zone of pri-
vacy” created by the “penumbras” that gave “life and substance” to 
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.211  In outlining this zone 
of privacy, the Court stated that even though some rights are not spe-
cifically mentioned in the Constitution, they are nonetheless “pe-
ripheral” to various freedoms in the Bill of Rights.212 
Although Griswold may have initially appeared to link the consti-
tutional protection of sexual activity to married couples, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird213 removed any such linkage.  In Eisenstadt, the Court extended 
Griswold’s holding to include “the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”214  As Justice Brennan declared: “If under Gris-
wold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be 
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be 
equally impermissible.”215  This decision marked a shift from privacy 
as “freedom from surveillance or disclosure of intimate affairs,” to 
privacy as “the freedom to engage in certain activities” and “to make 
certain sorts of choices, free of interference by the state.”216 
In 2003, the Court noted how its 1977 decision in Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International217 reiterated that “the reasoning of Griswold 
could not be confined to the protection of rights of married 
adults.”218  In overturning a statute that banned the distribution of 
 
 209 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a right of privacy exists). 
 210 Id. at 485–86. 
 211 Id. at 484, 485. 
 212 Id. at 483. 
 213 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a law banning the distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons violates the right of privacy, and hence extending the rul-
ing in Griswold to non-married individuals). 
 214 Id. at 453. 
 215 Id. (arguing for expanding the right of privacy to the individual from the cou-
ple). 
 216 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexu-
ality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 527–28 (1989); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 217 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 218 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003) (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 678). 
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contraceptives to minors as part of a state policy against teen preg-
nancy, Carey extended the right of privacy to minors engaging in con-
sensual sexual behavior.219  The Carey Court saw the right of privacy, as 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to include “‘the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.’”220 
In Roe v. Wade,221 the Court held that the right of privacy recog-
nized in the previous contraception cases was “broad enough to cover 
the abortion decision.”222  Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,223 which reaffirmed Roe, Justice Kennedy elabo-
rated on the right to privacy: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.224 
This “right to define one’s concept of the universe,” linking the right 
to an abortion to other kinds of intimate choices, thus became the 
latest evolution of the “emanations from penumbras” that first led to 
a recognized right to privacy.225 
In Lawrence v. Texas,226 the Court applied the right of privacy to 
hold that a Texas statute prohibiting people of the same sex from en-
gaging in certain sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause.227  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion recognized that the Court’s earlier deci-
 
 219 Carey, 431 U.S. at 693. 
 220 Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)). 
 221 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 222 Id. at 155.  Thus, a woman’s right to have an abortion was included within the 
zone of privacy created in Griswold.  Roe was reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992), which held that a woman’s 
right to choose an abortion is grounded in the concept of liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But to create this zone, the 
Court had to rule that an unborn fetus was not a “person” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See id. at 873. 
 223 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 224 Id. at 851. 
 225 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497 (1961)).  A further development in the expansion of privacy rights to 
cover the abortion decision occurred in Stenberg v. Carhart, where the Supreme Court 
struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting partial-birth abortion.  530 U.S. 914, 929–30 
(2000).  In his decision, Justice Breyer found the law burdensome on a woman’s abil-
ity to choose.  Id. at 930. 
 226 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 227 Id. at 567. 
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sion in Eisenstadt had established that the right to make certain deci-
sions regarding sexual conduct extended to all adults, regardless of 
gender or marital status.228  But in Lawrence, the Court gave explicit 
recognition to a right of sexual intimacy, which it had been unwilling 
to recognize in previous cases.229  Seventeen years earlier, the Court in 
Bowers v. Hardwick230 had refused to find that the right of homosexuals 
to engage in sodomy was a fundamental right, citing to the lack of 
history or tradition of protecting such a practice.231  Notwithstanding 
this previous reasoning the Court in Lawrence found just the opposite 
type of history and tradition, enabling it to rule that sodomy statutes 
offended an individual’s right to privacy.232  Consequently, in the 
wake of Lawrence, there is no longer any question as to whether a 
right to sexual privacy exists; the only question is what specific aspects 
of sexual privacy can or cannot be regulated.233  In his dissent, for in-
stance, Justice Scalia predicted that the next logical step in the rea-
soning of Lawrence would be the legalization of same-sex marriage.234 
2. A Liberty That Could Have Been 
As the Court has been developing a right to privacy, it has con-
tinued to downplay or ignore property rights, which for a century and 
a half were an explicit and primary focus of constitutional law.  In 
fact, only after the Court ceased treating the right to property as a 
fundamental right, requiring substantive due process analysis, did it 
begin to adopt such an analysis for issues involving non-economic in-
dividual rights.235  But the unanswered question resulting from this 
 
 228 Id. at 565.  Thus, Lawrence held that the Constitution permits homosexuals 
complete freedom in the area of sexual intimacy.  Id. at 567. 
 229 Hermann, supra note 161, at 928, 930. 
 230 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 231 Id. at 192–94. 
 232 Id. at 190, 192; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575, 584. 
 233 An emerging issue, for instance, is presented by a case addressing the constitu-
tionality of an Alabama statute regulating the distribution of sexual devices, includ-
ing the specific issue of whether the right to sexual privacy includes the right to use 
sexual devices.  See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005). 
 234 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 235 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (refusing 
to scrutinize, using a substantive due process analysis, legislation regulating labor re-
lations, and instead merely deferring to the congressional finding that there was a 
rational basis for the regulations and that the regulated activities had a substantial 
economic effect). 
Prior to 1937, property rights were seen by the Lochner-era Court (Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)) as fundamental to the Constitution’s view of a free 
and independent life.  But the New Deal constitutional revolution abandoned the 
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legacy is whether property rights are more important to individuals 
than sexual privacy rights.236  This question, however, would be an-
swered if the Court had pursued a structural path to individual liberty 
through the workings of the democratic process.  Indeed, privacy is 
not the kind of minority-rights issue on which the courts should pos-
sess sole authority.  Everyone, regardless of their race, religion, or in-
come status, is interested in privacy; it is not a special concern only of 
a certain, specified minority.  If one is to believe the courts, everyone 
sees sexual conduct as being essential to their self-definition; thus, 
everyone has an interest in, for example, the issue of contraception 
availability.  Consequently, privacy can be best protected through the 
Constitution’s structural provisions preventing governmental abuse 
of the lawmaking process. 
Protecting privacy interests through structural provisions would 
also allow for more flexibility, instead of locking in a particular judge-
made version of a particular right.237  However, because of the way 
privacy has evolved as a court-created right, there is an arbitrariness 
to the current constitutional doctrine.  Why, for instance, did the 
Court pick sexual activity as the area covered by privacy rights?  And 
what if there are many people who define themselves not through 
their sexual activities but through some other activity?238 
 
doctrine of substantive due process that had been applied exclusively to property 
rights.  Later, with the creation of privacy rights, the doctrine was revived; but this 
time the nature of liberty that was found essential under the Constitution for indi-
vidual freedom, and to which the Court gave heightened protection, was not eco-
nomic liberty but autonomy in intimate relations. 
 236 This is particularly evident in the public outrage in response to the public use 
takings case of Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), where the Supreme 
Court held that a city’s exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an eco-
nomic development plan, even if used to transfer property from one private party to 
another, satisfies the constitutional “public use” requirement.  Id. at 2665–66. 
 237 Regarding privacy and abortion rights, the Supreme Court has been accused of 
creating new rights.  See TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 20 (2004).  
But to apply the right to privacy to abortion, the Court has had to set in motion a 
whole train of consequences, including the ruling that an unborn child was not a 
person.  Consequently, the right to privacy became a “super-right,” which trumps 
even the interest in protecting potential life.  Id. at 145, 147.  Thus, to arrive at a 
right to abortion through a general right to privacy, the Court had to find in the 
Constitution a substantive right of privacy beyond anything that had ever existed be-
fore. 
 238 Evidence that the Framers did not recognize or even contemplate any kind of 
right to sexual privacy can be seen in the plethora of eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury laws punishing adultery.  See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Book Note, Sex and Social Order: 
The Selective Enforcement of Colonial American Adultery Laws in the English Context, 10 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 208–13 (1998) (reviewing MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 
(1996)). 
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The irony of the privacy right created by the courts is that it ex-
ists in a society where every aspect of personal privacy other than sex-
ual conduct is being eroded.  Sexual privacy is constitutionally pro-
tected, even though identity and informational privacy is under 
increasing assault from new technologies.239  Professor Fishman has 
outlined the host of ways in which technology is invading individual 
privacy.240  He describes the ubiquity of surveillance technology, the 
ease with which the internet can disseminate private information, and 
the ways in which personal data can be acquired through the use of 
credit cards, email, and even supermarket discount cards.241  And 
even more ironic, especially when one considers the constitutional 
efforts the judiciary has made to create a right of privacy, the Su-
preme Court has greatly aided the invasion of privacy by ruling that 
the media may publish or broadcast with impunity the contents of in-
tercepted communications known to have been unlawfully inter-
cepted, so long as the media did not participate in the unlawful in-
terception.242 
VI. CONCLUSION—THE NEXT STEP: A FULL RESTORATION OF 
FEDERALISM’S STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS 
Nearly seven decades have elapsed since the Court made its 
great constitutional compromise of 1937, abandoning the structural 
protections of the Constitution and choosing to protect individual 
liberty through the judicial enforcement of substantive individual 
 
 239 See generally PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, CHATTER: DISPATCHES FROM THE SECRET 
WORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 
(2005) (outlining all the ways in which personal data can be acquired and how peo-
ple’s movements and activities can be followed or recorded); see also generally Rebecca 
S. Murray, Book Review, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2004) (reviewing CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR 
NATION: MEDIA PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE (2000)) (discussing various 
types of voyeurism made possible by new technologies, as well as how the media uses 
its judicially-granted constitutional rights to invade individual privacy). 
 240 See Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of 
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1506–15 (2004). 
 241 Id. at 1505–11. 
 242 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001) (ruling that the media are im-
mune from civil damages suits brought under the Wiretap Act).  Aside from the me-
dia, the government also participates in the erosion of personal privacy.  For in-
stance, nearly every state employs a data encryption method on their drivers’ 
licenses.  John T. Cross, Comment, Age Verification in the 21st Century: Swiping Away 
Your Privacy, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 363, 372 (2005).  However, when 
the license is swiped through a digital scanner (for age verification purposes for ex-
ample), the private data stored on the card’s magnetic strip is susceptible to theft.  
Currently, more than seven million Americans are victimized by identity theft; and 
the driver’s license is a frequent means by which this theft occurs.  Id. at 394. 
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rights.  Given the benefit of hindsight, it can now be seen that much 
was sacrificed for the sake of upholding the constitutionality of the 
New Deal legislation.  Many scholars claim that this compromise has 
actually contributed to the erosion of individual liberty in America.  
In the view of Randy Barnett, it is the broad use of Commerce Clause 
powers “that has most often been used by Congress to restrict the lib-
erties of the people.”243  For this reason, Barnett suggests returning to 
a pre-New Deal understanding, in which the Constitution’s structural 
provisions were enforced as strictly as its individual rights protections 
are enforced now.244  Indeed, even though it was a calamitous event, 
the Great Depression should not continue to haunt constitutional law 
more than seven decades later. 
Reviving structural provisions like federalism will not only serve 
to protect individual liberty, but will also serve to facilitate a more dy-
namic, flexible and representational democracy.245  The same jurists 
and scholars who advocate judicial deference on structural matters, 
combined with judicial scrutiny on individual rights, support the no-
tion of a living constitution.  The idea of a living Constitution was ar-
ticulated by Justice William Brennan: “[T]he genius of the Constitu-
tion rests not in any static meaning . . . but in the adaptability of its 
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”246  
To advocates of a living Constitution, it is not possible to “lock in” the 
Constitution’s enduring principles.  However, this is just what the 
courts do when protecting individual liberty through “locking in” 
their interpretations of substantive individual rights, instead of letting 
liberty thrive through the organic workings of the Constitution’s 
structural provisions.247 
 
 243 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 277 (2004). 
 244 Id. at 278. 
 245 A criticism often made is that the Constitution does not represent the consent 
of the governed; indeed, how can present-day society be governed by provisions 
drafted by a small group of delegates more than 200 years ago?  As Professor Barnett 
asks: “How can a small minority of inhabitants presuming to call themselves ‘We the 
People’ consensually bind anyone but themselves?”  Id. at 20.  The answer lies in the 
structural aspect of the Constitution, which sets out the ground rules for a democ-
ratic society to continually keep reaching consent on the rules that bind it, not in the 
judicial enforcement of selected rights which do not even appear in the Constitution 
and which have never been consented to by the people in any constitutional sense. 
 246 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 27 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
 247 It has been suggested that the courts have had to intensify their scrutiny of in-
dividual rights precisely because, in the post-New Deal world, we have moved from a 
limited federal government with constrained powers to an expansive government 
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After Carolene Products, and certainly after Griswold, the Court has 
been willing to protect individual rights under a revived substantive 
due process doctrine.248  Perhaps this is because the Court virtually 
abandoned, until the 1990s, any enforcement of structural provisions 
like federalism that had long been the Constitution’s most effective 
way of protecting liberty.  Thus, during the second half of the twenti-
eth century, the Court intensified its scrutiny of individual rights be-
cause it could no longer rely on the structural provisions to guard 
liberty.  But given that those structural provisions were at least some-
what revived by the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism,” the Roberts 
Court should correspondingly lessen its activism in the individual 
rights area.  This retreat would also relieve the courts of having to de-
cide which rights merit “fundamental” status, as they currently do 
under the substantive due process doctrine, such as with privacy. 
So far, however, the Court has not adjusted its individual rights 
approach to coincide with its federalism approach.  As one scholar 
has noted, “the Rehnquist Court may well be the most pro-First 
Amendment Court that has ever sat.”249  It has protected the right to 
burn the American flag.250  It has struck down congressional attempts 
to regulate Internet pornography.251  It has come up with new kinds 
of substantive individual rights, such as the Lawrence right to homo-
sexual sex.  With respect to commercial speech, it has overturned 
regulation on tobacco advertising near schools.252  It has upheld the 
 
possessing broad powers.  See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspi-
cionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1240 
(2004).  For instance, the courts have crafted a detailed and comprehensive Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to respond to an expanded government capable of and 
willing to conduct suspicionless searches.  But such a jurisprudence was unnecessary 
in the Lochner era, when the Court enforced substantive limits on governmental regu-
latory power, in part because “suspicionless civil search regimes were reduced in ab-
solute terms because of the decreased number of regulatory regimes in existence.”  
Id. at 1241.  Thus, when the Interstate Commerce Commission was established as an 
exercise of expanded federal powers, it was “‘the first federal regulatory agency au-
thorized to police broadly the detailed operations of a significant sector of the U.S. 
economy.’”  Id.  (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW ET. AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (5th ed. 2003)).  This in turn provided 
more opportunities and occasions for an agent of the federal government to conduct 
searches of private entities. 
 248 BARNETT, supra note 243, at 232. 
 249 Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist 
Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 (2005) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 81). 
 250 United States. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
 251 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 252 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
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Miranda rule.253  And it has ruled against the government and in favor 
of individual enemy combatants in two of its the most significant 
cases involving the “War on Terror.”254  The Court’s ruling in Hamdi 
has been called a “strikingly libertarian response for the Court to take 
during wartime.”255  And yet, Hamdi was “nothing . . . compared to the 
extreme libertarianism the Court displayed, in Rasul v. Bush—the 
Guantanamo Bay detainees case.”256 
Contemporary courts, in their focus on individual rights, have 
also expanded the types of individual interests that qualify for proce-
dural due process protections.  In Hamby v. Neel,257 the Sixth Circuit 
held that an individual held a property interest in coverage under 
Tennessee’s Medicaid Demonstration Project, and hence could not 
be denied coverage without procedural due process.258  Similarly, the 
Second Circuit ruled that individuals had a protected property inter-
est in receiving benefits under New York’s Home Energy Assistance 
Program.259  And in Greene v. Barrett,260 the Tenth Circuit found that an 
officer with the Laramie County Sheriff’s Department had a pro-
tected property interest in his rank, and therefore could not be re-
duced in rank without receiving due process.261  Thus, in both a pro-
cedural and substantive sense, courts have continued their expansive 
individual rights jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that might be ren-
dered unnecessary by a revival of the Constitution’s structural protec-
tions of liberty. 
 
 
 253 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 254 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004). 
 255 Calabresi, supra note 249, at 1055–56. 
 256 Id. at 1056.  Calabresi further posited that the Rehnquist Court has “turned out 
to be strikingly libertarian on a whole host of issues.”  Id. at 1059. 
 257 368 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 258 Id. at 562. 
 259 Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 260 174 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 261 Id. at 1141.  Also, in Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995), the 
Seventh Circuit held that foster parents had a protected property interest in foster 
care benefits.  Id. at 1289.  In Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996), the court 
held that an illegal stowaway seeking asylum was entitled to the same procedural due 
process as other asylum applicants.  Id. at 201.  That case law derived in large part 
from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plyler v. Doe, holding unconstitutional Texas’s 
policy of excluding illegal aliens from its public schools.  457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) 
(stating that “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
illegal aliens). 
